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There is a large and robust correlation between adult health and education, part of which likely reflects
causality running from education into health. Less clear is whether education obtained later in life
is as valuable for health as are earlier years of schooling, or whether education raises health directly
or through income or wealth. In this paper, I examine how the timing of educational attainment is important
for adult health outcomes, income, and wealth, in order to illuminate these issues. Among military
retirees, a subpopulation with large variation in the final level and timing of educational attainment,
the health returns to a year of education are diminishing in age at acquisition, a pattern that is less
pronounced for income and wealth. In the full sample, the marginal effects on the probability of fair
or poor health at age 55 of a year of schooling acquired before, during, and after a roughly 25-year
military career are –0.025, –0.016, and –0.006, revealing a decline of about half a percentage point
each decade. These results suggest that education improves health outcomes more through fostering
a lifelong accumulation of healthy behaviors and habits, and less through augmenting the flow of income
or the stock of physical wealth.
Ryan D. Edwards
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The positive association between education and health or survivorship has been a subject
of much scholarly interest since the work of Kitagawa and Hauser (1973).1 There are plau-
sible lines of causality running both ways. Education could produce good health directly
by improving knowledge of healthy practices, or indirectly by raising socioeconomic status
or wealth. Or good health early in the life cycle could facilitate both more education and
better adult health. Other variables such as ability or time preferences could increase both
health and education, and reality could easily be some combination of all of these path-
ways. Studies of exogenous variation in schooling are rare, but those that exist reveal a line
of causality running from education to health outcomes (Adams, 2002; Oreopoulos, 2003;
Lleras-Muney, 2005), at least at lower levels of attainment acquired at younger ages. Cutler
and Lleras-Muney (2008) remark that less is known about the health eﬀects of higher edu-
cation, probably because natural experiments are more rare. They ﬁnd in the cross section
that the eﬀect of education on many indicators of health appears to be roughly linear in
years of school past the tenth, with no clear “sheepskin” eﬀects of particular levels of degree
attainment.
Individuals typically acquire primary and secondary education during adolescence, and
compulsory schooling laws require some or all of it. But college and other higher education
can often be acquired later in life. In certain countries and among particular subgroups,
delayed postsecondary and higher education is even rather common. Gall, Legros and New-
man (2006) illustrate how heterogeneity in the timing of education across the life cycle varies
signiﬁcantly across the OECD, with the narrowest distribution observed in Ireland and the
widest in New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden.2 They and Sj¨ ogren and Saez-Marti (2004)
construct theoretical models of the timing of optimal human capital accumulation based on
1Grossman (2006) and Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2008) provide recent reviews of this extensive literature.
2Gall, Legros and Newman (2006) measure the years separating the 20th and 80th percentiles in the age
at completing tertiary education. In Ireland, the gap is about 2 years; in the U.S., it is around 9 years; in
New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden, the gap is 20 years.
2the labor market returns associated with matching processes or confronting uncertainty in
returns and the price of time. Without those forces, of course, education later in life appears
suboptimal; in the traditional view of human capital (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974), education
that maximizes lifetime returns occurs as early in life as possible. Empirical estimates of the
labor market costs of delaying education broadly conﬁrm this story, in the sense that “gap
years” spent earning lower wages before acquiring education that raises wages are by deﬁni-
tion costly. But whether the returns to additional years of education depend on when they
were received during the life course is less clear, though it is the subject of much previous
research.3
Given the interconnections between health, income, and education, it is a natural exten-
sion to ask how the timing of education may aﬀect health. To my knowledge, no prior studies
have attempted to do so explicitly. As is often the case in the literature on interruptions
in education and earnings, the existing evidence derives from studies of military service.
Building oﬀ the work of Card and Lemieux (2001), who ﬁnd that draft avoidance raised
attainment during the Vietnam War, Grimard and Parent (2007) ﬁnd some evidence that
avoidance may have resulted in reduced smoking and thus better health for nonveterans.
This ﬁts with recent work by Bedard and Deschˆ enes (2006) that reveals higher mortality
among U.S. birth cohorts with high military participation ostensibly due to smoking, which
could be connected to delayed education.4 Given evidence of the net stimulative impact of
the midcentury G.I. Bill on the educational attainment of veterans (Bound, 2002; Stanley,
3Griliches and Mason (1972) examine a cross section of veterans in a 1964 Current Population Survey
and ﬁnd that returns to education acquired during or after military service were insigniﬁcantly higher than
returns to education received before service. Griliches (1980) and Marcus (1984) both explore the returns
to interrupted schooling in the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Young Men between 1966 and 1973,
and neither ﬁnd a penalty for interruption. More recent studies that focus on exogenous variation in the
incidence of military service reveal a zero net eﬀect for the World War II cohort (Angrist and Krueger,
1994) but negative and persistent eﬀects on earnings for later cohorts (Angrist, 1990, 1998; Imbens and van
der Klaaw, 1995). Light (1995) reveals wage penalties for delayed education among white men in the 1979
NLSY that persist for four years and then die out. After broadening the NLSY sample to include women
and minorities and adopting a diﬀerent statistical model, Monks (1997) ﬁnds permanent wage penalties for
delay. In Swedish data collected after 1985 on cohorts born before 1973, Holmlund, Liu and Skans (2008)
reveal persistent and signiﬁcant eﬀects on earnings associated with short delays in entering college.
4Other research reveals considerably more ambiguity about the net impact of military service on health
(London and Wilmoth, 2006; Dobkin and Shabani, 2009).
32003), it would appear that either delayed education is less valuable in terms of health, or
the negative eﬀect of military service on health is large enough to outweigh the beneﬁt of
increased education, or both are true. As of this writing, no study has examined the eﬀect of
the G.I. Bill on veterans’ health, or the eﬀect of delayed education on health more generally.5
In this paper I explore how the timing of education matters for health, income, and
wealth among an interesting subpopulation of veterans. I examine a cross-sectional survey
of military retirees that retrospectively asks about educational attainment at three stages of
the life cycle. It also asks about current health as well as service-related disability, which
measures a dimension of health prior to retirement. Military retirees are interesting for
several reasons. Their lengthy service careers, typically 20 years or more, is evidence that
their health and abilities during adolescence and young adult years must have met some
baseline standard. Thus they ought to be subject to less unobserved heterogeneity in factors
that aﬀect health than the rest of the civilian population, which should help reduce bias.
Military retirees also exhibit a very large amount of variation in the timing of education
across the life cycle. A majority receive additional education during military service, and
almost a third acquire more education after retiring with 20 years of service, typically after
age 45.
My strategy is to compare correlations between current adult health and education history
with correlations between current household income or wealth and education history. Data
limitations currently preclude a more careful unraveling of the multiple lines of causality;
instead, I check for robustness across selected subsamples. Result show that health returns to
education appear to be strongly and monotonically diminishing in age at acquisition across
broad stretches of the life cycle, which are measured in three parcels of roughly two decades
5The gap in the literature may be due to the apparent absence of a clean natural experiment vis-` a-
vis health in the context of military service. Even if drafted veterans ultimately acquire more education
than nonveterans, as the literature on the G.I. Bill suggests they do, military service is likely to exert an
independent eﬀect on health through combat exposure and other channels. This would complicate any
comparison of veterans to nonveterans. Diﬀerences across subgroups of veterans might be more interesting
if they were subject to plausibly exogenous variation in the determinants of education. Another direction
would be to focus on diﬀerences in the timing of education and health across all civilians, extending the
ﬁndings of Light (1995) and others to health.
4each. By contrast, there appear to be no vintage eﬀects of education on home ownership,
and the marginal eﬀects of education on income decline only post-service and not before.
These results suggest that the eﬀect of education on later-life health is channeled through
the lifelong accumulation of stocks, such as knowledge of healthy practices or human capital
and health earlier in life, and not via increases in income or wealth achieved later in life.
In the sections that follow, I ﬁrst describe the dataset and what it reveals about the life
cycle of education among military retirees compared to that of civilians, which has been
more broadly studied. Then I discuss a theoretical framework for thinking about health,
education, and military service over the life course, and I address the special characteristics
of veterans that are important for understanding patterns in their education timing and
health. The theoretical framework suggests several regression equations that allow me to
test hypotheses about the relationships between education timing and health, and between
health, income, and wealth. The next section presents and brieﬂy discusses the results, and
the ﬁnal section discusses their implications and some directions for future research.
2 The life cycle of schooling among military retirees
Figure 1 depicts the special timing of education across the life cycle among military retirees.
The data are drawn from the 2003 Survey of Retired Military (SRM), which asked retirees to
retrospectively report their levels of educational attainment when they entered the military,
when they retired, and at the time of survey.6 MacLean and Edwards (2009) describe the
dataset in greater detail. Figure 1 plots education trajectories across age for all male retirees
6The 2003 SRM is a snapshot of approximately 30,000 veterans, of which 16,155 are men aged 40 or over
with 20 or more years of active duty and a complete set of covariates. As I explain in the notes to Table 1, I
dropped 264 individuals with full covariates who reported losing educational attainment between life stages.
Responses are categories rather than years of attainment, so I translate between them using the following
scheme. Less than 12 years is probably age 16 or 10th grade. A GED or high school equivalency and high
school diploma are 12 years. Less than 2 years of college without a degree is 13 years. A 2-year college degree
is 14 years. More than 2 years of college credits but no 4-year degree is 15 years. A 4-year college degree
is 16 years. Some graduate school but no graduate degree is 17 years. A master’s, doctoral, or professional
degree is 20 years. An earlier survey in 1996 asks similar questions, but the public version of the 1996 SRM
reports age only in two broad groupings, under or over 65, so I focus on the 2003 survey because it measures
single years of age.
5aged 40 and older with 20 years of active duty service, and also plots separate trajectories for
oﬃcers and enlisted men. On average, military retirees entered service at age 20 with 12.8
years of school, left service at age 43 with 15.2 years, and reported 15.8 years of schooling at
survey, aged 57. As shown in the graph, this pattern of delayed attainment varies somewhat
by rank. Oﬃcers entered service two years later with 14.6 years of education compared to
11.9 among enlisted men; they gained 3.4 years of education during service as opposed to
1.8; and they received an additional 0.4 year rather than 0.8 year after retirement. For
enlisted men, the trajectory is almost linear, while it is concave but still strictly increasing
for oﬃcers.
The pattern of signiﬁcant delay among retirees of both ranks contrasts with patterns of
educational timing among members of a typical U.S. civilian cohort, who tend to complete
their education much earlier in life. Figure 2 shows the trajectory of average education by
age among members of the NLSY79 cohort, which decelerates after the mid-twenties. The
slope is about 0.85 prior to age 20, 0.34 between 18 and 22, and about 0.03 after age 22. By
comparison, the slopes in Figure 1 hover between 0.05 and 0.15.
Absolute levels of attainment in these two graphs are also revealing. With about 11.9
years of education by age 20 and 13.7 by age 42, enlisted retirees are very similar to the
civilians in the NLSY79 cohort in terms of their trajectories prior to retirement. But the
additional 0.8 year they acquire by age 55 is unique. Retired oﬃcers have much higher
levels of education than either group, and their rate of acquisition during military service is
uncommonly rapid for that age.
Table 1 reports more characteristics of the regression sample, stratiﬁed by ﬁnal rank and
by VA disability status.7 As shown across the columns, the timing and level of educational
attainment varies with rank but not as much with disability. This is consistent with similar
patterns in VA disability prevalence and level across oﬃcers and enlisted men. More than
three quarters of all retirees report acquiring additional education during their military
7The SRM contains self-reports of VA disability ratings as well as administrative data on actual ratings
derived from oﬃcial VA records. The two measures are similar in the data, but I rely on the latter.
6careers. Nearly a third acquired more education after retirement, with greater prevalence
among enlisted men and to a lesser extent disabled retirees.
The lower rows in Table 1 reveal that rank is correlated with current health and socioeco-
nomic status (SES), while disability status is strongly correlated with health and somewhat
with SES. Compared to enlisted men, retired oﬃcers are roughly half as likely to report
fair or poor health, they earn 75 to 80 percent more income, and they are 10 percent more
likely to own their own home. Non-disabled retirees are only 30 percent as likely as disabled
veterans to be in fair or poor health, and they earn 10 to 13 percent more income, but their
homeownership is actually slightly lower. Part of these SES patterns may reﬂect race and
ethnicity; African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately enlisted and VA disabled.
Compared to national data, Table 1 also implies that this subpopulation of military
retirees is relatively unhealthy, but this may be explained by the prevalence of combat-
related disability. Data from the 2003 National Health Interview Survey show 15.8 percent
of males over 40 report fair or poor health, compared with 18.1 percent of male veterans
over 40. Both ﬁgures are considerably lower than the 27.6 percent of male military retirees
over 40 who report fair or poor health as shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 1.8 But as
revealed in the fourth column, only 11.6 percent of retirees without a VA disability rating
report fair or poor health. The picture that emerges is of military retirees as a select group
compared to all civilians, with higher education and better health in older age in the absence
of combat-related disability, possibly due to better initial health. One interpretation of these
patterns is that military service reduces health through combat exposure, at least among
professional soldiers. This is a diﬀerent perspective than suggested by Bedard and Deschˆ enes
(2006), who ﬁnd that cigarette smoking rather than combat exposure explains the negative
health eﬀects of military service. But they consider the broader group of all veterans, not
just military retirees.
8The application of survey weights does not appreciably change the proportions in Table 1.
73 Theoretical considerations
In this section, I explore theoretical explanations for patterns of delayed schooling, discuss
relevant characteristics of veterans and their budget constraints, and I motivate testable
regression equations within a health capital framework. The underlying questions I seek to
address are whether delays in schooling aﬀect health, income, and wealth; and if they do,
whether those patterns reveal new information about the pathways through which education
aﬀects health.
3.1 A simple model of endogenous education timing
While being drafted is not a choice, completing a military career and becoming a military
retiree are choices, however constrained they may be. Thus it is natural to think of the
timing of education among military retirees as more or less endogenous, if relatively unique
to their situations. As reviewed by Grossman (2006), the theoretical literature on health
capital typically treats education as an exogenous variable that augments health production.
There are notable exceptions; Fuchs (1982) argues that time preference is a third variable
that causes both education and health, while Becker and Mulligan (1997) oﬀer support for
essentially the reverse view, that education and health can cause time preference. Later-life
schooling among military retirees could be consistent with Fuchs’s view if military service is
a treatment that produces a lower discount rate. But human capital theory can also produce
staggered timing through more straightforward channels, which I now discuss.
A closely related topic in labor economics concerns the extent to which omitted variables
like ability may cause both education and earnings, in other words, how education can be
endogenous. Building on earlier work by Becker (1967), Card (2001) provides an overview
of this work and develops a model with an endogenous amount of schooling. Card’s model
allows and produces heterogeneity in the duration of schooling but not its timing, presumably
because the latter is relatively rare among the U.S. civilian population as a whole.9 In the
9Card and Lemieux (2000) ﬁnd that only a quarter of the NLSY cohort interrupted schooling but later
8appendix, I present a straightforward extension of Card’s model that produces endogenous
education timing, and I summarize the main insights here.
Optimizing individuals without liquidity constraints will equate the marginal costs and
marginal beneﬁts of delaying education. In so doing, they compare the labor market returns
in terms of income y(·) to schooling S at time t, ∂y(S,t)/∂S, net of the cost of tuition,
T(t), and any utility costs of attending school, φ(t), with the real interest rate, r. Broadly
speaking, delay will not be optimal when the net returns to schooling exceed the real interest
rate, and it may never be optimal.
Patterns in completed schooling and its timing among military retirees suggest there is
heterogeneity in at least one component of marginal costs and beneﬁts, which include
1. The returns to schooling, ∂y(S,t)/∂S; lower returns prompt delay.
2. Net tuition costs, T(t); higher tuition prompts delay.
3. Utility costs of schooling, φ(t); higher costs prompt delay.
Delay of schooling could either be temporary or permanent depending on how each of these
evolves over time. Permanently higher tuition costs could produce a permanent delay of
schooling and permanently lower attainment, while temporarily higher tuition costs result
in a temporary delay.
Card (2001) argues that the evidence on returns to years of education indicates a smaller
role for heterogeneity in source 1, which comprises the economic beneﬁts of education, or
“ability,” and a larger role for sources 2 and 3, the diﬀerences in the marginal costs of
schooling. This is because instrumental variables estimates of the returns to education,
which tend to derive from policy-driven extensions of schooling into underserved subgroups
who might have low ability, tend to be at least as large as OLS estimates. Whether source
1 is also relatively unimportant for the timing of schooling seems plausible but is less clear.
returned, and more than half of the returners complete a semester or less. These ﬁgures are similar to but
slightly below those reported by Light (1995), who examines the 800 returners out of the 2,489 white men
in the NLSY.
9The returns to schooling may be very diﬀerent across individuals of diﬀerent ages even if the
evidence suggests they are the same within a particular age range.
3.2 Military service and education timing
Compared to nonveterans, military retirees are unambiguously more likely to delay education
because of relatively generous post-service education subsidies, which aﬀect marginal costs
via source 2. According to the 2008 Green Book, the maximum full-time enrollment beneﬁt
that year under the Montgomery G.I. Bill (Chapter 31) was $1,101 per month over 36
months, or about $10,000 per nine-month academic year, for veterans who had served at
least three years. This is a very large subsidy; current estimates of average educational
expenses from the National Center for Education Statistics are between $12,000 and $16,000
depending on the type of degree and whether room and board are included. The new Post-
9/11 G.I. Bill (Chapter 33) is even more generous, oﬀering up to full funding of a four-year
college degree for veterans with three years of active duty service. Veterans with a service-
related disability rating of at least 20 percent also qualify for vocational rehabilitation and
employment beneﬁts, which can cover college or vocational training.
It is also conceivable that sources 1 or 3, the returns to education or the utility costs
of schooling, could be diﬀerent for veterans than for civilians, either in level, trend, or
both. In an all-volunteer force, service members are likely to be a select group with special
characteristics that led them to enlist rather than obtain more education.
Liquidity constraints could also be important for education timing and for veterans in
particular. If borrowing against future earnings is unavailable, individuals with low wealth
would be more likely to delay education, possibly entering military service as an alternative
or in order to gain education subsidies.
One of the most important characteristics of a service member is his or her rank, which
is strongly correlated with a variety of life outcomes including adult health (MacLean, 2008;
MacLean and Edwards, 2009). Rank also interacts with education; enlisted men typically
10must have completed a high school degree, while commissioned oﬃcers must have earned
a college degree. And as Table 1 shows, the timing of schooling acquisition is somewhat
diﬀerent for oﬃcers versus enlisted men. Retired oﬃcers started with more education and
gained it faster, but by the time of survey, enlisted men have narrowed the initial gap.
Because rank could proxy ability, I pay special attention to it in my empirical analysis.
3.3 Health and education timing
Health capital could appear either as another argument in the utility function (Picone,
Uribe and Wilson, 1998), a factor inﬂuencing the time horizon in a “pure investment” model
(Grossman, 1972), or as both (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). I make no attempt here to
formally model the relationship between health and education timing, because I do not
believe it would reveal any insights that are testable in the public SRM data. Instead, I
outline how an analogous model with health would be similar to the appendix model, I
propose some testable hypotheses, and in the next subsection I specify regression equations
based on budget constraints in a model of health capital.
As reviewed by Grossman (2006), uncertainty remains about the pathways, but education
plausibly raises health either through raising the value of any particular health investments,
or enhancing “productive eﬃciency” per Grossman (1972) and others, or by raising the
overall frequency of health investments or healthy behaviors given ﬁxed budgets, enhancing
“allocative eﬃciency.” If earnings are not held constant, of course, education could also raise
health by raising earnings. Whatever the precise channel involved, the full marginal beneﬁts
of schooling should be higher for everyone once one accounts for health, other things equal.
As is true with labor market returns to education, it is conceivable that the shape of the
health production function through education varies across individuals. If true, low health
returns could be an additional reason for an individual to delay or forgo education. But
Grossman (2006) reports that most IV estimates of the eﬀect of education on mortality or
health, such as obtained through expansions of compulsory schooling, are larger than OLS
11estimates. Following the logic of Card (2001), this suggests that the marginal health beneﬁts
of schooling may not vary systematically due to ability bias; rather, the marginal costs of
schooling are likely to be more important.
This reasoning naturally leads to some testable if tentative hypotheses about the relation-
ship between delayed education and stocks and ﬂows of health and wealth. If the marginal
beneﬁts to schooling are indeed fairly static across individuals and across age, we would ex-
pect to ﬁnd that those with a certain ﬁnal level of educational attainment should enjoy the
same ﬂow of health investments or income regardless of whether they ever delayed schooling.
This is basically consistent with the results of Light (1995), which suggest that earnings
eventually rebound after gap years, but not with all ﬁndings in the literature on gap years
and wages. In contrast, one would expect that stock variables like health and wealth should
be permanently lower among observationally equivalent individuals who delayed their edu-
cation. This is because their health investments and incomes must have been lower during
the delay. Needless to say, for signiﬁcantly delayed education such as the gaps of several
decades among military retirees, a key unknown is how the marginal beneﬁts of schooling
may vary across age. This reasoning assumes they do not, but it is equally plausible that
age could either impede or improve learning.
A second set of hypotheses concerns the relative as opposed to the absolute associations
between schooling vintages, health, wealth, and income, which are motivated by our interest
in untangling the relationships between all of these correlated variables. If education of a
particular vintage aﬀects one ﬂow or stock variable but not the other, or if the trajectory of
marginal eﬀects is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, such patterns reveal information about the path-
ways through which education aﬀects health. For example, later-life education may raise
income and wealth but not health, suggesting that education raises health through lifelong
accumulation of knowledge about healthy behaviors rather than by raising wealth or income.
123.4 A testable regression model
To formally explore the empirical eﬀects of delayed education on health, it is useful to
examine budget constraints in a discrete-time model of health capital. Assume individuals
maximize utility subject to three “ﬂow” budget constraints that describe the dynamics of
stocks of health Ht and wealth Wt, and the ﬂow of income yt:
Ht = (1 − δ)Ht−1 + h(mt,St) + ǫ
H
t (1)
logyt = f(Ht,St) + ǫ
Y
t (2)
Wt = (1 + r)Wt−1 + yt − ct − pt · mt − Tt · ∆St + ǫ
W
t (3)
Years of schooling acquired as of time t is St; δ is the rate at which health depreciates;
health production h(·) depends on medical spending mt and schooling St, whose prices are
pt and Tt; ct is other consumption; r is the real interest rate; labor is supplied inelastically
and normalized to 1, and wages f(·) are a function of health and schooling; and the ǫ’s are
white-noise errors.
With information on the timing of schooling over the life cycle, I can rewrite these
equations to test for vintage eﬀects. As shown by Table 1, the SRM contains measures of
retirees’ stocks of education at entering the military, at leaving the military, and at survey,
which roughly correspond to ages 20, 45, and 55. The stock of education at survey can be
additively decomposed:
S55 = S20 + (S45 − S20) + (S55 − S45)
= S20 + ∆S45 + ∆S55. (4)
Using equation (4) and some simplifying assumptions, I can rewrite the structural budget
constraints as estimable regression equations of health, wealth, and income at the time of
survey at age 55. I posit the health production function h(·) is linear in its arguments, and I
13assume a Mincerian log earnings function f(·) that is as well. I must omit medical spending
because it is not observed in the SRM. After inserting a vector controlling for observable










H logy55 + γ
























W logy55 + γ
W · X55 + ǫ
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t (7)
Health depends on past health, education, current income, and other characteristics; income
depends on current health, education, and other characteristics; and wealth depends on
current health, education, current income, and other characteristics.
Endogeneity is readily apparent in this system, and instrumental variables or some other
approach would be necessary to fully address it. The public version of the 2003 SRM includes
no geographic identiﬁers and no good instruments, so I focus on OLS results in this paper.
What is interesting is how the η’s, the coeﬃcients on schooling, change by vintage over the life
course, how their trajectories vary across equations (5), (6), and (7), and how they compare
to coeﬃcients on total education ever attained. If the ηH’s fall faster with age than the ηy’s,
for example, the implication is that education aﬀects health through the lifelong acquisition
of protective stocks that accumulate slowly, like knowledge and patterns of healthy behavior,
rather than through the impact of education on income.
4 Data and results
As shown in Table 1, the health metrics in the 2003 SRM include self-reported health status
on a ﬁve-point Likert scale, two questions about health-related work limitations, and sev-
eral indicators of functional limitations or disability. For each of these, I generate binary
indicators of bad health and model H55 in the health equation (5) with a logit. Results are ex-
14pressed as marginal eﬀects in order to enhance comparability with Cutler and Lleras-Muney
(2008). Earnings and household income are both measured with high granular detail and
minimal topcoding. To estimate the income equation (6), I model the log of each measure
using OLS. The only measure of wealth available to estimate equation (7) is an indicator of
whether the retiree owns or rents his own home, which I model using a logit.
The vector of characteristics observed in the SRM, X55, includes an indicator variable
for oﬃcer status, age, race, ethnicity, and marital status. I use VA disability rating as an
indicator of health at 45, H45. As in Table 1, I restrict my estimation sample to include
men over 40 with at least 20 years on active duty. To help address selection problems, I ﬁrst
estimate the models on the entire sample and then separately across important subgroups.
4.1 Full sample
Each row in Table 2 displays estimates of the education coeﬃcients, η20, η45, and η55, from
a separate health, income, or wealth regression. The ﬁrst nine rows report the marginal
eﬀects of schooling by vintage on the probability of each health condition measured in the
data, the following two rows reveal the marginal eﬀects of schooling on log earnings and log
household income, and the last row shows the marginal eﬀects of schooling on the probability
of homeownership. The last column in each row depicts the marginal eﬀect of total years
of education from a separate regression in which vintage eﬀects are constrained to be zero,
which is the standard speciﬁcation in the literature.
The ﬁrst row in Table 2 reveals that earlier years of education are signiﬁcantly more
protective against self-reported fair or poor health than are later years. The marginal eﬀect
of education at entering the military is −0.0254 and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; the
coeﬃcient on education earned after entering but before retirement is −0.0161 or about a
third smaller but still highly signiﬁcant; and the coeﬃcient on post-retirement education is
only −0.0059 and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The last coeﬃcient is about one third
the size of the constrained marginal eﬀect associated with total years of education at survey,
15−0.0158, which is shown in the last column of the ﬁrst row. By comparison, Cutler and
Lleras-Muney (2008) report marginal eﬀects of total years of education on self-reported fair
or poor health ranging from −0.0073 to −0.0152 depending on the number of controls.
A similar pattern emerges in the following 8 rows. For most of these health indicators,
years of education acquired during service are protective against the dimensions of bad health
in Table 2, but in each case they are also signiﬁcantly less protective than years acquired
before service. Education acquired after service appears to be practically meaningless for
these measures of bad health. As shown in the last column, total years of education are
protective against all these conditions except diﬃculty hearing, but only in the case of
diﬃculty seeing is the marginal eﬀect of post-service education negative and signiﬁcant. It
is unlikely that power is an issue here; as shown in Table 1, these health conditions are
generally as prevalent as self-reported fair or poor health.
Patterns in the bottom three rows reveal a diﬀerent relationship between education vin-
tage and SES outcomes. Earnings rise 5.5 percent with each year of education prior to
service, then rise 5.8 percent with each year acquired during service, but they do not re-
spond signiﬁcantly to years acquired after service. Household income rises 6.4 percent with
education prior to service, 6.1 percent with education during service, but only 2.7 percent
with post-service education, all signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. For both deﬁnitions of
income, the reduction of more than half in the marginal eﬀect of education after retirement
is highly signiﬁcant, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between education acquired prior to
service versus during service. The divergence in results, namely how post-service education
aﬀects household income but not labor earnings, reﬂects the sensitivity to post-service edu-
cation of the respondent’s income from assets, pensions, and transfers, and of the spouse’s
income.10
10There are four components of individual income in the 2003 SRM: labor earnings, asset income, pension
income, and transfers. Household income is the sum of these across respondent and spouse. The respondent’s
transfer payments are individually the most sensitive to post-service education, but excluding them does
not change the qualitative result. Transfer income in the 2003 SRM includes all of the following as a
single item: supplemental security income, unemployment insurance, civilian or military disability, worker’s
compensation, the G.I. Bill, food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or welfare, and
16The last row in Table 2 shows that the probability of home ownership responds equally
to education across all vintages including post-service. Although there is a slight decline in
marginal eﬀects with age, the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. Each additional
year of education raises the probability of home ownership by about 0.6 percentage point.
4.2 Subsamples across rank and disability
As Table 1 shows, there are sometimes large diﬀerences across these groups in health, educa-
tion, and SES, which raises the concern that selection could be important. Indeed, one way
of interpreting rank is that it proxies ability. VA disability is partially compensated with
educational subsidies. In Table 3A, I reestimate equations (5), (6) and (7) on subsamples
deﬁned ﬁrst by rank and then by VA disability status. Among each subsample, I model
self-reported fair or poor health, log household income, and home ownership.
The top panel examines diﬀerences between oﬃcers and enlisted men. For both groups,
the health eﬀects of education fall strongly with age. This is more pronounced among
enlisted men, for whom the marginal eﬀects fall by half from −0.0381 to −0.0194, both
highly signiﬁcant, and then by a third to −0.0070, signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level.
By contrast, income and wealth eﬀects of education are stable prior to retirement for both
groups, while post-service education matters only for the income and housing of enlisted
men. As in Table 2, the eﬀect of post-service education on income is only about half the size
of eﬀects prior to retirement for enlisted men, while it is insigniﬁcant for oﬃcers. If ability
bias were driving the downward-sloping vintage eﬀects of education, one would expect them
to vanish or at least lessen when the sample was constrained to the group with higher ability,
namely oﬃcers. Here we ﬁnd no such evidence.
In the bottom panel of Table 3A, groups stratiﬁed by VA disability exhibit similar pat-
terns. The chief diﬀerences from the top panel are that both disability groups beneﬁt from
post-service education in terms of income and home ownership, and retirees without a VA
child support or alimony. The components of spousal income that vary signiﬁcantly with the respondent’s
post-service education are labor and pension income.
17disability experience health beneﬁts. But among both groups, there are signiﬁcant vintage
eﬀects of schooling on health earlier in the life cycle, while vintage eﬀects of schooling on
income are only important post-service. There is limited evidence of any vintage eﬀects on
home ownership; there is a larger eﬀect of pre-service education for the non-disabled. It
is interesting that marginal eﬀect of education on health stays the same during and after
service for retirees with no VA disability, while it falls for disabled retirees. In isolation,
this result might suggest a role for VA disability in producing downward-sloping marginal
eﬀects. But we still see a reduction in the marginal eﬀect among the non-disabled group
after entering the military. Thus vintage eﬀects of education on health appear not to be
concentrated among the disabled.
4.3 Subsamples of returning students
There may be variables other than rank and disability status that are correlated with patterns
of schooling, although those two are likely to be the main determinants. Another feasible
strategy to address selection is to reestimate the models among subgroups that have either
returned for additional education or not. Such a technique draws identiﬁcation from diﬀering
treatment intensity among the treated. As shown in panels A and B of Figure 3, there is
considerable variation in the amount of extra education earned among both subgroups of
returning students, those who acquired additional education during service (panel A), and
those who acquired more post-service (panel B). If the determinants of reentering school
diﬀer from the determinants of how much schooling to receive upon having returned, then
this approach will help address the problem of endogeneity in the decision to return.
The top panel in Table 3B explores how vintage eﬀects of education may depend on
whether the retiree returned for post-service education. As in Table 3A, the levels of the
estimates change somewhat, but few qualitative diﬀerences from the baseline results in Table
2 are apparent, which suggests they were fairly robust to this form of selection. Both
post-service returners and non-returners experience signiﬁcantly reduced marginal eﬀects on
18health of education received during service, −0.0267 and −0.0134, compared to that received
before, −0.0469 and −0.0204. In both cases, the marginal eﬀects fell by about 40 percent over
roughly 25 years. For post-service returners, the marginal eﬀect on health of post-service
schooling is similar in magnitude to that in Table 2, but it is insigniﬁcant. Both groups
consistently beneﬁt from schooling prior to retirement in terms of income, and marginal
eﬀects on home ownership are stable if also insigniﬁcant in the case of returners. Those who
obtain education post-service beneﬁt from it in terms of income, but the marginal eﬀect is
again signiﬁcantly lower than for earlier vintages of education, much as in Table 1.
The bottom panel of Table 3B presents estimates among groups deﬁned by whether they
obtained education during service. Patterns that are now familiar reemerge. Vintage eﬀects
of education are clear and large in the health regressions, while in the income regressions
there is no signiﬁcant vintage eﬀect until post-service. Pre-service education matters twice
as much for home ownership than later education among those who acquired more education
during service. This pattern is also found among non-disabled retirees, as shown in the lower
panel of Table 3A, but its meaning is unclear.
5 Discussion
Military retirees are a unique group with considerable heterogeneity in the timing of their
education across the life course, and in their SES and health following their retirement from
the military. Although not all results will directly generalize to civilian populations, this
group is worth studying because their special characteristics have the potential to reveal
new insights about the dynamics of health, SES, and education over the life course.
The primary contribution of this study is to show that the health returns to education
appear to be strongly and monotonically diminishing in the age at acquisition. For the full
subsample from the 2003 Survey of Retired Military, the marginal eﬀect on the probability of
self-reported fair or poor health of an additional year of education acquired before military
19service begins, around age 20, is −0.025. It diminishes to −0.016 for education acquired
during service, usually up to about age 45, and then to −0.006 for education acquired after
retirement and by the time of survey, around age 55. Based on the midpoints of these age
ranges, this trajectory represents an average rate of decline of about 0.5 percentage point
each decade. Similar patterns emerge for the other measures of bad health in the 2003 SRM.
For many of these, which focus on functional limitations, education acquired post-service has
no signiﬁcant eﬀect at all, while education during service remains signiﬁcantly protective,
but less so than pre-service education.
In contrast, the vintage eﬀects of education on income and wealth are quite diﬀerent. The
marginal eﬀects of education acquired before or during military service on income are roughly
constant at about 0.06. But the marginal eﬀect of post-service education on labor earnings is
insigniﬁcant, while the marginal eﬀect on household income falls by half to 0.03. Meanwhile,
marginal eﬀects on the probability of home ownership tend to be constant across educational
vintage at about 0.06. This last result is particularly striking because unlike income, wealth
is a stock like health, which should display permanent eﬀects of temporarily lower inﬂows.
That health is permanently lowered by delayed education while wealth is not would be a
provocative ﬁnding. But home ownership is a poor measure of the stock of wealth; the dollar
value of housing or other assets would be far preferable but is unavailable in the 2003 SRM.
Indeed, data limitations temper many of these results. There may be unobservable
characteristics and selection issues that could bias the basic OLS results. This study draws
identiﬁcation only from cross-sectional and longitudinal statistical patterns, and not from
any natural experiment. But results are robust across a broad array of subsamples that
cut along the lines most likely to be important for selection. Patterns are broadly similar
for oﬃcers and for enlisted men, which suggests that unobserved ability bias may not be
important. Among retirees without a VA disability, the marginal eﬀect of education on
health does not fall again after retirement, but it is already half as large as it was prior to
service. Retirees with VA disabilities, the majority of the sample, experience larger drops in
20the protective eﬀects of post-service education but consistent declines through life. The age
trajectory of marginal eﬀects is also strongly declining within subgroups that choose to seek
more education. In all of these cases, the marginal eﬀects of education on health decline
monotonically with age, while the eﬀects on income and wealth either remain stable or stay
constant before declining only post-service.
The similarity of such patterns across many subgroups is reminiscent of the ﬁnding within
labor economics that the marginal beneﬁts to earnings of education may not vary substan-
tially across individuals, or with ability (Card, 2001). It is also somewhat consistent with
related results on the response of health outcomes to policy-driven shocks in educational
attainment (Adams, 2002; Lleras-Muney, 2005). In these literatures, the similar size of OLS
and IV estimates of the marginal eﬀect of schooling — the latter often are larger than the
former — suggest that marginal beneﬁts may either be similar across subgroups or may vary
inversely with ability, and that variation in marginal costs better explains heterogeneity in
attainment. Here, there appears to be some variation across subgroups in the marginal
beneﬁts of education of a particular vintage, at least in health if not in income or home
ownership. But the age trajectories of these marginal beneﬁts are very similar across all
subgroups.
It is striking that the wage premium on education should remain relatively constant
across vintage while the health premium monotonically declines with age. The stability
of the marginal eﬀect of education on home ownership suggests further that the pathways
linking education, health, and SES over the life course are neither simple nor static. Thus the
second main contribution of this study is to provide some new insight into the relationships
between these factors.
An obvious channel through which education could aﬀect health is by raising income
and wealth, both of which are protective. But if that were an important channel, education
that earns a particular amount of income or wealth should enhance health exactly the same
regardless of when the education was acquired. The basic result here, that both early and
21later-life education are interchangeably important for income and wealth, while early-life
education is much more valuable for health, is not supportive of this perspective. Rather,
it is more consistent with the results of Adams et al. (2003), who ﬁnd that at older ages,
causality runs more from health into wealth rather than the reverse. Later-life education
may bring ﬁnancial reward, but by then the die has been cast in terms of health.
On the basis of these ﬁndings, it would appear that education aﬀects adult health through
a much longer, possibly lifelong, process of building up healthy stocks, whether it is knowl-
edge of healthy behaviors, an understanding and respect of scientiﬁc and medical opinion,
or something else. This is entirely consistent with the concept of health capital (Grossman,
1972), but it also suggests that the depreciation of health or healthy knowledge must be small
relative to the ﬂow of new health investments, since new education presumably changes the
latter immediately.
It is unclear whether these results generalize to a broader setting or are relatively speciﬁc
to military retirees, a special group that frequently engages in later-life education, which
is otherwise rare in the U.S. Given more widespread dispersion in the timing of education
in other OECD countries (Gall, Legros and Newman, 2006), a fruitful next step may be to
examine foreign datasets. But these results also suggest it is worthwhile to examine health
dynamics and education timing in richer U.S. panel data such as the NLSY, PSID, and HRS,
whenever education timing can be measured.
22Appendix: A model of endogenous education timing
For simplicity, imagine schooling can be delayed indeﬁnitely, but that once begun, it must
be completed in full.11 Let ρ be the time discount rate, s ≥ 0 the endogenous starting date
of schooling, S the duration of schooling in years, u(c(t)) the enjoyment of consumption, and




























where r is the interest rate, y(S,t) is the full-time wage, p(t) is the part-time wage earned
while in school, and T(t) is the cost of tuition. Card’s model is the special case of s = 0.
Here, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to S, the total years of acquired schooling, is
λe
−r(s+S) [MB(S) − MC(S)] = 0, (10)













−(ρ−r)(s+S) φ(s + S) (12)
11In reality, schooling investments can also be lumpy. A more realistic model would allow for discrete
chunks of schooling, but the same properties of time-dependent marginal costs relative to marginal beneﬁts
that are important here would still end up driving results. In addition, any ﬁxed costs of starting or stopping
education could also become important. Qualitatively, that story is similar to the one illustrated by this
simpler model.
23are the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of the Sth year of schooling expressed in period-
(s + S) dollars. These equations diﬀer from Card’s only insofar as they also depend on the
endogenous starting date, s.
When s is endogenous, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to s is revealing:
λe
−rs [MB(s) − MC(s)] = 0, (13)
where MB(s) and MC(s) are the marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs associated with an
increase in s. The marginal beneﬁt of increasing s and thus delaying education includes
earning y(0,s) and avoiding the costs of tuition T(s) and utility φ(s) today, and earning
p(s + S) in the future:




−(ρ−r)s φ(s) + p(s + S) e
−rS. (14)
The marginal cost comprises foregone part-time earnings p(s), foregone full-time earnings
y(S,s + S), and the delayed tuition and utility costs:
MC(s) = p(s) + y(S,s + S) e





−(ρ−r)(s+S) φ(s + S). (15)
An interior solution requires that marginal costs rise faster than marginal beneﬁts and that
the schedules actually cross.
Subtracting equation (14) from (15) reveals that the costs of delaying education exceed
the beneﬁts when
MC(s) − MB(s) = p(s) − p(s + S) e
−rS
+ y(S,s + S) e
−rS − y(0,s)








−(ρ−r)Sφ(s + S) − φ(s)
￿
> 0. (16)
24Marginal costs can exceed marginal beneﬁts when either the part-time wage p(t) grows slower
than the interest rate, or when either the return to schooling, ∂y/∂S, or tuition T(t), or the
utility cost of attending φ(t) grows faster than the interest rate. Other things equal, any
of these scenarios prompts the individual to move schooling forward in time by reducing s.
For the special case in which p(t), T(t), and φ(t) are all always zero, this condition reduces
to the familiar comparison of whether the return to schooling exceeds the real interest rate
(Willis, 1986; Card, 2001).
For the average individuals who is not liquidity constrained, empirical estimates of the
budget parameters in equation (16) suggest that the marginal costs of delay may easily
exceed the marginal beneﬁts globally. The real interest rate r is around 3 percent, while
growth in real wages averages about 2 percent. The returns to a year of schooling are
perhaps 10 percent (Card, 2001), considerably higher than r. According to oﬃcial statistics,
real costs of tuition, room, and board T(s) are rising at about 2.5 percent, but for tuition
alone the ﬁgure is more like 6 percent (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). These ﬁgures
suggest many individuals may locate at a corner solution, s = 0. But the behavior of utility
costs over time or age is less clear. If learning becomes more diﬃcult with age, one would
expect that φ′ > 0, and the individual might prefer a small s. But if age confers discipline
and patience, those might lower φ and thus reduce the costs of delaying education because
φ′ < 0.
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Source: 2003 Survey of Military Retirees and author’s calculations. The universe is all male retirees with
at least 20 years on active duty aged 40 and older. The data include age at survey in single years; age at
retirement is calculated using age at survey minus an estimate of the year of retirement, which is reported
in 5-year intervals; age at entering is calculated as age at survey minus single years spent on active duty.
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Source: 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and author’s calculations. The universe is all
members of the NLSY cohort with education data.
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Average age 56.5 59.1 55.2 55.9 57.0
Average years on active duty 22.8 24.0 22.1 22.3 23.1
Average age at retirement 43.1 45.6 41.7 42.4 43.5
Average age at enlistment 20.3 21.7 19.6 20.1 20.4
Average years of education:
 At entering military 12.8 14.6 11.9 12.9 12.8
 At retirement 15.2 18.0 13.7 15.2 15.2
 At survey 15.8 18.4 14.5 15.8 15.9
 Percent acquiring education during service 77.4 80.8 75.5 74.9 79.0
 Percent acquiring education after retirement 30.2 15.0 38.1 25.9 33.0
Percent officer at retirement 34.4 100.0 0.0 34.8 34.1
Average labor earnings, earners $53,201 $76,021 $41,440 $56,964 $50,296
Percent earners 73.8 72.5 74.4 79.7 69.7
Average household income $91,794 $127,448 $73,115 $96,495 $88,640
Percent who own home 88.1 93.3 85.3 87.5 88.4
Average VA disability percent rating 28.2 26.7 29.0 0.0 47.1
Percent with any VA disability rating 59.8 59.3 60.1 0.0 100.0
Health (Percent reporting):
 Fair or poor self-reported health 27.6 18.9 32.2 11.6 38.3
 Ever had work limitations 45.4 38.7 48.9 18.1 63.7
 Ever left a job for health reasons 11.0 6.4 13.5 3.5 16.1
 Any difficulty seeing 45.9 38.6 49.7 36.0 52.5
 Any difficulty hearing 57.4 56.4 57.9 46.7 64.5
 Any difficulty walking 32.1 26.1 35.2 12.8 45.0
 Any difficulty lifting 10 lbs 27.2 21.3 30.3 9.6 39.0
 Any of these 4 difficulties 75.5 71.2 77.8 62.7 84.1
 Any nights spent in a hospital last year 21.3 17.9 23.1 13.2 26.7
Percent African American 12.9 9.1 15.0 9.0 15.6
Percent Hispanic 3.2 1.8 3.9 2.6 3.6
Percent married 85.7 89.8 83.5 85.2 86.0
Percent never married 1.5 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.3
Sample size 16,155 5,554 10,601 6,487 9,668
Notes:  The subsample universe is males over the age of 40 with 20 or more years of ac ve‐duty service who answered the ques ons 
on demographic characteris cs, income, and self‐reported health status. It excludes 264 individuals who reported ever losing 















 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0254 ** -0.0161 ** -0.0059 * 0.2286 16,155 -0.0158 **
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0018)
 Ever had work limitations -0.0296 ** -0.0148 ** 0.0085 * 0.2802 16,083 -0.0129 **
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0024)
 Ever left a job for health reasons -0.0092 ** -0.0036 ** -0.0019 0.1882 16,127 -0.0045 **
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0009)
 Any difficulty seeing -0.0167 ** -0.0062 ** -0.0069 * 0.0392 16,102 -0.0091 **
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0020)
 Any difficulty hearing -0.0101 ** 0.0007 0.0054 0.0523 16,040 -0.0011
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0020)
 Any difficulty walking -0.0206 ** -0.0082 ** 0.0046 0.1871 16,045 -0.0081 **
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0019)
 Any difficulty lifting 10 lbs -0.0171 ** -0.0060 ** 0.0064 * 0.2035 16,070 -0.0055 **
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0017)
 Any of these 4 difficulties -0.0139 ** -0.0048 ** 0.0000 0.0909 16,099 -0.0062 **
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0016)
 Any nights spent in a hospital last year -0.0112 ** -0.0028 0.0040 0.0968 15,789 -0.0030 *
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0015)
INCOME MEASURES:
 Log earnings in 2002 0.0552 ** 0.0578 ** 0.0107 0.1024 11,564 0.0460 **
(0.0063) (0.0054) (0.0078) (0.0045)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0636 ** 0.0614 ** 0.0269 ** 0.1748 16,155 0.0536 **
(0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0029)
WEALTH MEASURES:
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0067 ** 0.0064 ** 0.0058 ** 0.1282 16,155 0.0063 **





modeled using a logit, with marginal eﬀects shown.  A nega ve coeﬃcient means educa on is protec ve against poor health.  Log income is modeled with ordinary least squares 
(OLS).   The last column in each row shows the marginal eﬀects of life me years of educa on from a separate regression in which total educa on ever a ained is the only 
educa on varable.  Standard errors are in parentheses;  sta s cal signiﬁcance is denoted by one (5%) or two (1%) asterisks.  Data are from the 2003 Survey of Re red Military;  















 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0140 ** -0.0104 ** -0.0043 0.2244 5,554 -0.0121 **
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0042) (0.0020)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0575 ** 0.0529 ** -0.0049 0.0947 5,554 0.0547 **
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0103) (0.0046)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0048 ** 0.0037 ** 0.0017 0.0892 5,554 0.0042 **
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0012)
ENLISTED MEN
 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0381 ** -0.0194 ** -0.0070 0.2119 10,601 -0.0169 **
(0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0025)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0616 ** 0.0640 ** 0.0352 ** 0.0818 10,601 0.0525 **
(0.0068) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0037)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0062 * 0.0077 ** 0.0080 ** 0.1182 10,601 0.0076 **
(0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0016)
NO VA DISABILITY
 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0174 ** -0.0086 ** -0.0081 ** 0.0732 6,487 -0.0106 **
(0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0018)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0688 ** 0.0560 ** 0.0267 ** 0.2119 6,487 0.0528 **
(0.0060) (0.0051) (0.0078) (0.0043)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0120 ** 0.0065 ** 0.0062 * 0.1545 6,487 0.0078 **
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0017)
SOME VA DISABILITY
 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0292 ** -0.0197 ** -0.0034 0.1976 9,668 -0.0178 **
(0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0027)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0604 ** 0.0647 ** 0.0278 ** 0.1528 9,668 0.0542 **
(0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0063) (0.0039)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0031 0.0055 ** 0.0047 * 0.1148 9,668 0.0047 **
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0014)















 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0469 ** -0.0267 ** -0.0084 0.2152 4,873 -0.0206 **
(0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0053) (0.0040)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0724 ** 0.0811 ** 0.0291 ** 0.0890 4,873 0.0511 **
(0.0107) (0.0096) (0.0079) (0.0059)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0067 0.0054 0.0032 0.1023 4,873 0.0045
(0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0023)
NO POST-SERVICE EDUCATION
 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0204 ** -0.0134 ** 0.2279 11,282 -0.0159 **
(0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0020)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0577 ** 0.0548 ** 0.1997 11,282 0.0558 **
(0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0036)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0057 ** 0.0058 ** 0.1415 11,282 0.0058 **
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0013)
SOME EDUCATION DURING SERVICE
 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0333 ** -0.0157 ** -0.0072 * 0.2329 12,496 -0.0183 **
(0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0020)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0662 ** 0.0573 ** 0.0300 ** 0.1750 12,496 0.0533 **
(0.0048) (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0033)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0089 ** 0.0042 ** 0.0048 * 0.1215 12,496 0.0056 **
(0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0012)
NO EDUCATION DURING SERVICE
 Self-reported fair or poor health -0.0117 * -0.0018 0.2198 3,659 -0.0081 *
(0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0041)
 Log household income in 2002 0.0580 * 0.0117 * 0.1566 3,659 0.0435 **
(0.0081) (0.0109) (0.0072)
 Home ownership in 2002 0.0036 0.0073 0.1466 3,659 0.0049
(0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0028)
Notes: See the notes to Table 2. Each row reports es mates from a separate regression of the dependent variable within the indicated subsample. 